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Domestic Violence and the Danger of Joint
Custody Presumptions
JUDITH G. GREENBERG*

In the last election, voters in Massachusetts voted overwhelmingly in
favor of a measure that would require courts, in most situations, to give
divorcing parents shared physical and legal custody of the children.'
532,716 people voted in favor of the non-binding referendum provision and
106,521 people voted against it. The provision was on the ballot only in2
thirty-seven districts, thus not all voters had an opportunity to vote on it.
Although the Massachusetts referendum was non-binding, it is just one
example of a larger movement to make joint custody the norm in divorces.
At least ten states and the District of Columbia have statutes that create
preferences of one sort or another for joint custody. 3 In Michigan, divorced
*
Professor of Law, New England School of Law. I would like to thank the New
England School of Law for its support of this article with a stipend, the librarians at the New
England School of Law for all their help, Luz Carrion and Doris Gelbman for their excellent
research assistance, and the students of Northern Illinois University College of Law for
organizing this symposium.
1. The actual text in front of the voters in thirty two of the districts said:
Shall the state representative from this district be instructed to vote in
favor of legislation requiring that in all separation and divorce proceedings involving minor children, the court shall uphold the fundamental
rights of both parents to the shared physical and legal custody of their
children and the children's right to maximize their time with each parent,
so far as is practical, unless one parent is found unfit or the parents agree
otherwise, subject to the requirements of existing child support and
abuse prevention laws?
The text in front of voters in the remaining five districts said:
Shall the state representative from this district be instructed to vote for
legislation to create a strong presumption in child custody cases in favor
of joint physical and legal custody, so that the court will order that the
children have equal access to both parents as much as possible, except
where there is clear and convincing evidence that one parent is unfit, or
that joint custody is not possible due to the fault of one of the parents?
ELECTIONS Div., OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH [MASSACHUSETrS],

State Election 2004 Ballot Questions, at http://www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/eleidx.htm (last
visited Apr. 24, 2005).
2.
Results of Local, Regional Ballot Questions, BOSTON GLOBE, availableat
http://www.boston.conm/news/special/politics/2004_results/general-eection/questions-all-b
y-town.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2005).
3. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-914 (2001); FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13(2)(b) (1997); IDAHO

CODE § 32-717B (1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (1994); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 132

(West 1999); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19A, § 1653 (1964); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24
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fathers have recently filed suit to force courts to opt for joint custody on a
regular basis.4 Despite this apparent swell of support for the creation of a
preference for joint custody, I argue against presuming that custody should
be jointly awarded to both parents. Such a presumption would be dangerous
for victims of spousal abuse.
Joint custody is dangerous for victims of spousal abuse because it allows, and sometimes even facilitates, the continuation of patterns of abuse.
Victims of abuse are likely to be particularly affected by a joint custody
preference because a disproportionate number of the cases that actually get
litigated, as opposed to decided by the parties' agreement, involve domestic
violence. 5 This means that many of the cases in which the courts end up
imposing joint custody by decree on unwilling parents will be cases involving domestic violence. The presumption does exactly this. It requires the
court to impose joint custody on the parties, even if one objects strenuously.
It leaves little room for the court to consider the child's best interest, unless
the presumption is rebutted. Recognizing the potential dangers involved,
the statutes use two mechanisms to protect victims of violence from having
joint custody imposed on them. Most joint custody presumption statutes
have an exception for situations in which there is domestic violence. Furthermore, in some states, the presumption in favor of joint custody only
attaches if the parties agree to joint custody. Neither of these approaches, it
turns out, is successful in protecting victims of violence and their children.
As a result, we run significant risk that in ordering joint custody we are
requiring these victims to continue interacting with their abusive partners
even though the legislatures that wrote the statutes clearly did not mean for
this to happen.

(2004); Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.375 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT.
STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (1978); WIs. STAT. § 20-2-201 (?).
4.

ANN.

§ 148:17 (1992); N.M.

Kim Kozlowski, Divorced Mich. FathersSue for Equity in Child Custody, THE

Oct. 31, 2004, availableat
http://www.detnews.com/2004/metro/0410/3 l/a01-320553.htm.
I am using the terms "spousal abuse" and "domestic violence" interchangeably
5.
although I realize their emphases and coverage may be different. "Spousal abuse" would
appear to be limited to those who are or were married, while "domestic violence" implies
physical abuse. I recognize that the phenomenon under discussion involves many different
forms of abuse, including psychological and financial abuse that need not have any physical
component. I mean to include these and other various forms of abuse when I use the term
"domestic violence." For stylistic reasons, I want to be able to use more than a single term.
I will also frequently refer to the victims of violence as women. Some older research
showed women engaging in violence toward their male partners at the same rates as men.
MURRAY A. STRAUS et al., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS 36-38 (1981). More recent research
points out that where injury is involved, men are considerably more likely to be the perpetrators. RICHARD J. GELLES, INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES 92-93 (3d ed. 1997).
DETROIT NEWS,
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Data as to joint custody-legal and physical-is hard to come by and
conflicting. 6 In 1992, in their large scale study of custody arrangements in
California, Eleanor Maccoby and Robert Mnookin found that courts most
commonly awarded parents joint legal custody.7 In contrast, according to
Robert Emery, the 1990 data from the National Center for Health Statistics
shows that only sixteen percent of divorce decrees across the country involved joint legal custody. 8 Not surprisingly, studies show that physical
custody is awarded to mothers much more frequently than to fathers.9 As
with most issues relating to divorce, this is usually the result of parental
agreement.' 0
However, contrary to what one might expect, courts often award joint
physical custody to the parents in situations in which the parents cannot
agree on custody.
Courts awarded joint physical custody to the parents in more than onethird of the cases in which each parent had requested sole physical custody." Indeed, in cases in which custody was resolved without court or
family services intervention, only twenty percent of the families opted for
joint physical custody. This means that when the parents are able to make
the decision for themselves without outside assistance, they decide to be
joint custodians of the children in only one-fifth of the cases. In contrast, in
cases that involved some judicial or family services intervention, forty percent resulted in joint physical custody. 12 It may be that courts and mediators, who are faced with parents with strong, conflicting positions on how to
handle custody, resort to what they see as a compromise: split the child.
The question addressed here is, "Is this a good idea?" When parents do not
6.
Joint legal custody means that one has the right to participate in major decisions
about the child's life, generally including decisions about the child's education, health care
and religion. Physical custody, in contrast, gives one parent the daily care for that child.

7.
ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL
AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 103 (1992).
8.
ROBERT E. EMERY, Postdivorce Family Life for Children:An Overview of Research and Some Implications for Policy, in THE POSTDIVORCE FAMILY: CHILDREN,

PARENTING AND SOCIETY 6 (Ross A. Thompson and Paul R. Amato eds., 1999). Similarly,

Marjorie Gunnoe and Sanford Braver report significant differences in the reports of awards
of shared physical custody. Majorie Gunnoe & Sanford Braver, The Effects of Joint Legal

Custody on Mothers, Fathers,and Children, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25, 26 (2001) (ranging
from five percent to twenty percent).
9.

ELEANOR E. MACCOBY, The Custody of Children of Divorcing Families: Weigh-

ing the Alternatives, in THE POSTDIVORCE FAMILY: CHILDREN, PARENTING AND SOCIETY 5960 (Ross A. Thompson and Paul R. Amato eds., 1999) (stating that mothers are awarded
physical custody eight times more frequently).
10.
MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 7, at 108 (noting that "[t]wo-thirds of requests for joint legal custody were either by agreement or unopposed.").
11.
Id. at 149-50, 159.

12.

Id. at 151.
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want joint legal or physical custody, should courts be forcing it on them?
This, after all, is what a presumption in favor of joint physical and legal
custody would do.
Proponents of a presumption in favor of joint custody give several reasons for favoring it. First, they argue that such a presumption would be in
the best interests of children. Second, they see joint custody as a means of
increasing equality between mothers and fathers and of undermining traditional gender roles. And finally, proponents of joint custody are skeptical
of the ability of judges to discern which custodial arrangements will work
best in particular situations. A preference for joint custody will minimize
judicial intervention in the family, leaving it to the parties to make the
shared custodial arrangement work. Although in some settings there may
be some truth behind each of these claims, none is sufficiently weighty to
support a presumption in favor of joint custody that might inadvertently
work to require an abuser and his abused partner to remain in continual
contact.
One of the most appealing arguments for joint custody, both legal and
physical, is that it is in the best interests of the child. Child psychiatrists
have long argued that children benefit from stability. In 1973, Goldstein,
Freud and Solnit published their influential Beyond the Best Interests of the
Child in which they asserted that a single custodial parent should be given
as much authority over the child as possible.' 3 They thought this would
produce stability for the child. More recently, however, commentators have
argued that custodial arrangements that mimic the two parent family are the
most desirable because they produce stability over time in providing continuing contact with both parents.1 4 There have been numerous studies of
joint custody arrangements and their effects on children.' 5 One concludes
across multiple
bluntly that "children in joint custody are better adjusted,
16
types of measures, than children in sole... custody."
13.
(1973).

JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

53-64

14.
MEYER ELKIN, Joint Custody: In the Best Interest of the Family, in JOINT
CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING 11, 12 (Jay Folberg, ed. 1984) (joint custody says that
"[families are forever."); Sheila F.G. Schwarz, Toward a Presumption of Joint Custody, 18
FAM. L.Q. 225, 232 (1985) (the preferred custodial arrangement would allow each parent to
be "responsible for and genuinely concerned with" the children).
15.
See, e.g., Robert Bauserman, Child Adjustment in Joint-Custody Versus SoleCustody Arrangements, 16 J. FAM. PSYCH. 91 (2002) (Bauserman performed a meta-analysis
of 33 studies); Marjorie Lindner Gunnoe and Sanford L. Braver, The Effects of Joint Legal
Custody on Mothers, Fathers, and Children, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25 (2001) (this research database included 340 families); Janet R. Johnston, High-Conflict Divorce, 4 FUTURE
OF CHILD 165 (1994) (reviewing research).
Bauserman, supra note 15, at 97; Marjorie Lindner Gunnoe & Sanford L.
16.
Braver, The Effects of Joint Legal Custody on Mothers, Fathers, and Children, 25 LAW &
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Nevertheless, there is reason to wonder whether joint custody is really
as good for children as this assessment implies. The studies' results are
sometimes difficult to interpret. 17 Some of the studies consider only joint
legal custody,' 8 while others lump joint legal and joint physical custody
results together. 19 While this may be useful for many purposes, it is problematic for lawyers trying to determine whether a presumption that favors
joint physical custody would be in children's best interests. Another problem is that many samples include families that have opted on their own for
joint custody in one form or another. The effects of joint custody on children in such families may be radically different from the effects on children
whose parents did not agree to the joint custody, but for whom joint custody
was ordered by a court.2° One would expect that families that choose joint
custody have parents who get along better than those who prefer sole custody and that this ability to get along pre-divorce would continue postdivorce, producing better outcomes for the children. Thus, as one author
says, "[i]mportantly, a causal role for joint custody cannot be demonstrated
because of the correlational nature of all research in this area.", 2' Finally,
but most importantly for my purposes, these studies recognize that joint
custody-however desirable it is for some families-is likely to be extremely problematic for families in which one parent is violent or otherwise
abusive toward the other. In these instances, joint custody is likely to facilitate the continuation of the violence and abuse because it is more likely to
require the parents to interact with each other about the children 2
Proponents of a presumption in favor of joint custody also argue that it
will equalize the positions of men and women and help to undermine traditional gender roles. Sanford Braver argues that awarding sole custody to a
mother with visitation to the father leaves men feeling disenfranchised in
HUM. BEHAV. 25 (2001) (noting the "mildly positive assessment of joint custody outcomes
for children.").
17.
One website has devoted an entire section to claims by proponents of joint custody
and
rebuttals
by
opponents.
Debunking
the
Claims,
at
http://www.thelizlibrary.org/l-Iiz/liz/those-jointcustody-studies.html.
18.
Gunnoe & Braver, supra note 8; Catherine R. Albiston et al., Does Joint Legal
Custody Matter?, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 167 (1990).
19.
Bauserman, supra note 15, at 97 (discussion of adjustment measures).
20.
Gunnoe & Braver, supra note 8, at 35; Bauserman, supra note 15, at 98 (considering possibility that couples with low levels of conflict select joint custody); Albiston et al.,

supra note 18, at 177; JAY FOLBERG, Custody Overview, in JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED

PARENTING 3, 8 (Jay Folberg, ed. 1984) (noting that shared legal custody is usually awarded
because of an agreement between parents).
21.
Bauserman, supra note 15, at 98.
22.
Id. (recognition of the concern that joint custody will expose children to ongoing conflict); Gunnoe & Braver, supra note 8, at 37 (results for families characterized by
domestic violence merit special consideration); SANFORD L. BRAVER, DIVORCED DADS 202-

04 (1998).
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terms of their children's lives. Men are seen as, and see themselves as,
breadwinners, excluded from participation in raising their own children.
According to Braver, joint legal custody "tells the father in an official way
that he is still his child's parent. He gets to participate in the same kind of
decision-making concerning the child that fathers from intact families must
deal with. He gets the right to continue to look out for his child's interests.",23 The argument is that fathers with joint custody, even if only joint
legal custody, are able to participate in the lives of their children more
equally with their ex-wives. This furthers sexual equality and would be
beneficial to everyone.24 Once again, however, the data on whether joint
custody achieves these goals is contradictory. Sanford Braver, in his study
of interviews with divorced fathers and mothers, reports that joint legal
custody results in higher rates of father-child visitation. 25 This may indicate
that fathers are taking on a nurturing role as well as the traditional role of
economic bread-winner.26 However, other studies have had very different
findings as to the effect of joint legal custody on role equalization. One
large scale review of studies of the impact of fathers' visitation found that
fathers' involvement affected the children in varying ways depending on
the type of involvement, the mother's acceptance of the father's involve27
ment and the degree of conflict between the parents. This hardly indicates
that fathers who have joint custody automatically are perceived as taking on
a nurturing role. Furthermore, there is evidence that even if the initial custody order provides for joint physical custody, over time the children are
likely to end up living in their mothers' custody.2 8 This can happen in one
of two ways. In some cases, despite the award of joint physical custody,
the children live with their mothers. One study showed that shortly after a
divorce which awarded joint physical custody of the children, only forty
five percent of the families actually had their children living jointly with
both parents. In sixty nine percent of the remaining families, the children
lived with their mother despite the custody decree.29 Other children ended
BRAVER, supra note 22, at 181.
24.
Karen DeCrow, a former President of the National Organization for Women,
advocates joint custody so that women will not always be required to be the primary parents
and will be able to strive for workplace equality. BRAVER, supra note 22, at 183.
Gunnoe & Braver, supra note 8, at 34; BRAVER, supra note 22, at 194; Joan B.
25.
23.

Kelly, Children's Adjustment in Conflicted Marriage and Divorce, 39 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD

ADOLESC. PSYCH. 963, 969-70 (2000).
BRAVER, supra, note 22, at 194 (fathers with joint legal custody pay a greater
26.
percentage of their child support than fathers with visitation), contra Gunnoe & Braver,
supra note 8, at 34 (noting that joint legal custody is not necessarily associated with higher
child support payments).
Kelly, supra note 25, at 969.
27.
28.

29.

MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 7, at 164-70.

Id. at 166, Table 8.1.
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up living with their mothers despite joint physical custody decrees because
they migrated there after having spent some time in shared custody. This
same study showed that only fifty four percent of those families that began
with shared physical custody still retained it three and one half years after
the initial separation. Families that moved out of the shared custody arrangement usually moved toward children residing with their mother. 30 All
of this detail is probably more than we need for our purposes. It does make
it unlikely, however, that awards of shared physical custody are likely to go
far toward establishing new, more equal, gender roles. Indeed, the opposite
message might be conveyed. Children who move from shared physical
custody to maternal custody might experience that as further reinforcing the
perceived learning that mothers can care for children better than fathers can.
Similarly, if children continue to live with their mothers despite a court's
order of joint custody, they may assume that both of their parents are so
unsure of their father's ability to care for them that their parents are willing
to resist a court order. Either of these occurrences may result in reinscribing the traditional gender roles in the children's minds.
Finally, some proponents of a presumption in favor of joint custody
argue that it is necessary because of judicial bias against giving custody to
fathers. Certainly, the vast majority of custody awards do go to mothers.
Some of the fathers' advocates who support joint custody think this is due
to discrimination against fathers. For example, one website says that it is
easy for mothers' lawyers to win custody. They merely need to stand up in
court and say, "present - your honor.",3' But, this website claims it is much
harder for a father to win. In representing a father, one must "dot your I's
and cross your T's . .. ,32 Another website supporting a greater role for
divorced fathers in raising children says,
The combined force of well-meaning but misguided laws,
judicial traditions, and government policies drive many
loving fathers out of their children's lives. For instance, the
former head of the Brooklyn Family Courts said, 'You
have never seen a bigger pain in the ass than the father who
wants to get involved
.... This type of involved father is
33
pathological.'

30.
Id. at 168.
31.
"A-Team" Website, at http://www.a-team.org/fathers-wincustody.html, last
visited Jan. 22, 2005.
32.
Id. The A-Team Website describes itself as a site made up of doctors, lawyers,
and others dedicated to helping "those wrongly accused of child abuse, domestic violence,
date rape, sexual harassment and other crimes that are gender or family related." Id.
33.
Fathers and Families website, at

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 25

Certainly, the best interests standard, with its requirement that judges
weigh a number of factors, allows for a subconscious bias to creep into the
decision. It is often difficult for appellate courts to review decisions made
pursuant to the best interests standard because trial courts consider many
factors, each of which can be weighed differently when balanced against
the others. 34 The issue on review is whether the trial court abused its discretion. This is a standard that is not frequently met.35 As a result, one can
easily be suspicious that the judge's decision was influenced by a particular
bias that has not been identified by the reviewing court.36 A 1997 study by
a number of psychologists reinforces the concern that gender biases of one
type or another may creep into trial courts' determinations. The study
found that a majority of the judges who responded to the authors' questionnaires believed that young children adjust better to divorce if placed with
their mothers.37 Similarly, half of the judges who participated thought that
joint custody after divorce was not in a child's best interest, while only a
quarter favored joint custody. 38 Although the study did not show why
judges took these positions, the results are consistent with the claim that
there is an underlying bias against giving divorced fathers custodial responsibility. 39 However, this does not necessarily mean that a presumption in
favor of joint physical and legal custody is the solution. Expanding educational programs, including judicial education, is a better solution given the
http://www.fathersandfamilies.org/site/strategy.php, last visited Jan. 22, 2005. The Fathers
and Families website says the organization "advocat[es] for the right of every child to have
two parents." Id.
Flournoy v. Flournoy, 392 So.2d 1096 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. (1980)) (no written
34.
reasons were given for custody decision; the appellate court considered the mother's possible moral unfitness).
35.
Owens v. Owens, 2005 WL 123438 (Tenn. Ct. App.); Brown v. Brown, 606
S.E.2d 785 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004); Erika R. Schwarz, Note, When "Neutral" Doesn't Really
Mean "Neutral," 42 Loy. L. REV. 365, 383 (1996).
36.
Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender and Justice, 42 FLA. L. REV. 181, 191 (1990)
(quoting judges who state a preference for mothers as custodial parents).
37.
Leighton E. Stamps et al., Judges' Beliefs Dealing with Child Custody Decisions, 28 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 3, 8-9 (1997). Thirty one approved of the statement:
"young children adjust better when placed with their mothers than with their fathers,"
whereas only two disagreed with the statement. Twenty four were neutral in relation to it.
Id.
38.
Id. at 8, 12. Thirty one judges disagreed with the statement: "joint physical
custody is in the best interests of the child," while fifteen agreed with the statement, and
twelve were neutral.
39.
It is important to remember that others have charged that judges harbor biases
against mothers in determining custody. Schafran, supra note 37, at 192 (discussing the
double standard used against mothers who are sexually active); D. Kelly Weisberg, Professional Women and the Professionalization of Motherhood, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 295
(1995) (discussing biases against mothers who work outside of the home).
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dangers that joint physical and legal custody represent to victims of intimate violence.
Various forms of shared or joint custody are bad ideas as custody defaults when the parents do not come to an agreement themselves. 40 Most
commentators recognize that where there has been domestic violence, joint
custody is inappropriate. Even Michael Lamb, who argues in favor of children continuing to have real relationships with both their parents despite
what he sees as almost ubiquitous conflict in modern divorces, recognizes
that in some situations the conflict is so severe that the children should not
have any contact with the abusive parent.4 ' Joint custody presumptions
have their most powerful effect on cases that are decided by litigation.
There, the presumption mandates that the court award joint custody. Unfortunately, cases that get to litigation (or even to judicial intervention short of
litigation) are exactly those most likely to involve domestic violence. Recent research shows that approximately seventy five percent of the contested custody cases that require judicial intervention are cases in which
there is a history of domestic violence.42 This means that in situations in
which the court sends a case to mediation, orders an evaluation or holds a
trial, it is significantly more likely than not that there has been domestic
violence. Presumptions in favor of shared custody then do not make sense
given that so many of the cases in which the parties cannot resolve the children's custody without judicial intervention are cases involving domestic
violence.
Batterers often use any contact afforded them by the court as a means
of continuing the abusive relationship with their former partners. Abusive
relationships usually involve the batterer establishing control over his victim through a combination of physical, emotional, and financial methods.
This is not likely to end with divorce. Indeed, for many targets the abuse
becomes worse at separation.4 3 Batterers use any opportunity or contact to
perpetuate the abuse in an effort to maintain their control. Some use the
40.
Approximately eighty percent of cases settle without requiring either a custody
evaluation or trial. MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 7, at 150.

41.
MICHAEL E. LAMB, Noncustodial Fathersand Their Impact on the Children of
Divorce, in THE POSTDIVORCE FAMILY: CHILDREN, PARENTING, AND SOCIETY 114 (1999).
42.
Peter G. Jaffe et al., Common Misconceptions in Addressing Domestic Violence
in Child Custody Disputes, 54 Juv. & FAM. CT. 57, 58 (2003); Janet R. Johnston, High Con-

flict Divorce, 4 FuTuRE OF CHILD 165, 168 (1994) (discussing studies that show between
sixty five and seventy five percent of families involved in divorce counseling have a history
of domestic violence; these levels are more than thirty six times the level of domestic violence found in divorcing couples in general).
43.

Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12-

19 (1991) (arguing for the recognition of "separation assault" because of worsening violence
upon separation); Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection,
11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 657,704 (2003).
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continuing connection that comes from joint custody or visitation rights to
harass or verbally abuse their victims. 44 Others use it as an opportunity to
pressure the victim to return to the batterer.4 5 Still others continue their
physical abuse during these times. For example, in one study a victim reported that during visitation the children's father pressured her to engage in
sexual relations with him. When she refused, he attacked her, choking her
and stabbing her in front of their three year old child.46
This continuation of the abusive connection between the victim and
the batterer is likely to be bad for the child, not good. Children do not
thrive when their mothers are caught in violent relationships. There is considerable evidence that it is the violence and the controlling relationship
that develops as a result that is injurious, not just the conflict between the
parents that often accompanies divorce.47 Children who grow up in families in which there is domestic violence experience a number of behavioral,
psychological, and educational difficulties. Studies show that over eighty
five percent of children in families in which there is domestic violence have
been witnesses to it. 48 Studies also show that children witness about half of
the incidents of domestic violence. 49 Even more children are "exposed" to
the abuse because 5they
see broken objects, bruises on the victim, or watch
0
the abuser's arrest.
Children who have been exposed to domestic violence often act in socially unacceptable ways. They are likely to be aggressive and destructive
toward other children, to be more oppositional in their behavior, to be cruel
to animals, and to use drugs and alcohol. 5' These children also have troubled friendships. They are less likely than other children to have close
friends and yet they are more likely to worry about their friends.52 They are
also likely to suffer from depression, to tend toward suicide, to have low
self-esteem, and to experience somatic symptoms like headaches, insomnia

44.
45.
46.

G. SILVERMAN, THE BATrERER AS PARENT 110 (2002).
Id.
N. Zoe Hilton, Battered Women's Concerns About Their Children Witnessing
Wife Assault, 7 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 77, 82 (1992).
47.
BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 45, at 39; Cosandra McNeal & Paul R.
Amato, Parents' Marital Violence: Long Term Consequences for Children, 19 J. FAM.
ISSUES 123, 135 (1998).
48.
Cynthia Grover Hastings, Letting Down Their Guard: What Guardians Ad
Litem Should Know about Domestic Violence in Child Custody Disputes, 24 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 283, 308 (2004).
49.
Id.
50.
Id.
51.
BANCROFr & SILVERMAN, supra note 45, at 38; Clare Dalton et al., High Conflict Divorce, Violence, and Abuse, 54 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 11, 17 (2003).
52.
BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 45, at 38.
LUNDY BANCROFT & JAY
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or bedwetting.5 3 In addition, they often show signs of post traumatic stress
disorder, including nightmares, flashbacks, and hyper-vigilance.54 Recent
research shows that some of this may even be due to changes in the children's brain structures. Although these last may be irreversible, there is
also some evidence that at least some of the behavioral and psychological
problems
improve if the children are removed from their father's pres56
ence.
As a result of these difficulties, children exposed to domestic violence
also have difficulty in school. 57 Their hyper-vigilance makes it hard for
them to concentrate on schoolwork. They have difficulty reflecting or focusing on their own work. Indeed, there are unusually high rates of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder among these children. Children from
families in which there is intimate partner abuse also often have problems
relating to other people, both their peers and adults. If they engage in fights
with or bullying behavior toward other children, they will constantly be in
trouble in school. One legal services organization has reported that many
of the clients who need representation because they have been suspended or
expelled from school turn out to be children traumatized by domestic violence.58 Children who have been traumatized in their homes may perceive
the world as dangerous and unpredictable. This attitude makes it hard for
them to trust either their teachers or their school to keep them safe.
Domestic violence, whether between cohabiting parents or separated
parents, is also deleterious for children because the children frequently get
caught up in the violence. This can happen in one of two ways. First, those
who abuse their partners are also likely to be abusive toward their children.
Clare Dalton, Susan Carbon and Nancy Olesen note that studies have found
that almost half of those who abuse their intimate partners also abuse their
59
children, whereas only seven percent of non-batterers abuse their children.
Dalton, Carbon and Olesen also point to studies that show that mothers of
incest victims are likely to be battered by the child's abuser. 60 Another
study found that approximately one quarter of batterers kidnapped or
threatened to kidnap their children during times when they had access to
53.

Dalton et al., supra note 52, at 17.

55.
56.
57.

Dalton et al., supra note 52, at 18.
See Jaffe et al., supra note 43.
Susan F. Cole and M. Geron Gadd, Uncovering the Roots of School Violence,

58.
59.

Id. at 609 (experience of the Massachusetts Advocacy Center).
Dalton et al., supra note 52, at 18; BANCROFr & SILVERMAN, supra note 44, at

54.
Id.; David A. Wolfe et al., The Effects of Children's Exposure to Domestic
Violence, 6 CLINICAL CHILD & FAM. PSYCH. REV. 171, 184 (2003).

34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 601 (2000).

43 (citing other studies showing batterers' child abuse rates of seventy and forty percent).
60.
Dalton et al., supra note 52, at 18; BANCRoFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 45, at
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them.6' Children may also get caught up in the violence in other ways.
Sometimes children are emotionally torn by the situation, trying to maintain
some loyalty to each parent.62 In other cases, however, children are physically injured by the domestic violence. One recent study found that a quarter of the women responding said that their children were "physically involved" in the battering incident.6 3 Sometimes this physical involvement
occurs because the children have intervened in the abusive incident in an
effort to protect their mothers. Other times the children are injured because
the batterer's assaults on the children's mother put the nearby children at
risk. Zoe Hilton describes the incidents that were reported to her as follows:
One man threatened, while driving with his wife and children in the car, to crash the car and kill them all. Some
men pushed, hit, and squeezed women with babies in their
arms. One man tried to pull a child away from his separated wife during an unofficial access visit ....
64
Whether or not the father intends to injure the child, it is dangerous for a
child to be in a setting in which there is violence against the child's mother.
Finally, domestic violence is injurious to children because it tends to
reinforce the worst aspects of gender norms. Men who have witnessed domestic violence as children are more likely themselves to engage in violence towards their intimate partners and more likely to be sexually assaultive towards these partners. 65 Girls, on the other hand, may grow up thinking that being a victim is an element of being female. 66 Both boys and girls
are likely to develop negative attitudes toward women, seeing them as stupid or incompetent. Two researchers have concluded that this contributes
to girls' lack of self-esteem. 67 "Particularly disturbing are the politics of
61.
Katherine M. Reihning, Protecting Victims of Domestic Violence and Their
ChildrenAfter Divorce, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 393, 394 (1999).
62.
Margaret Crosbie-Burnett, Impact of Joint Versus Sole Custody and Quality of
Co-parental Relationship on Adjustment of Adolescents in Remarried Families, 9 BEHAV.
Sci. & L. 439, 447 (1991).
63.
David A. Wolfe et al., supra note 55, at 177; BANCROFr & SILVERMAN, supra
note 45, at 38 (children often involve themselves physically in battering incidents to protect
their mothers).
64.
N. Zoe Hilton, Battered Women's Concerns About Their Children Witnessing
Wife Assault, 7 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 77, 80-81 (1992); BANCROFT & SILVERMAN,

supra note 45, at 44 (reports of assaults against the mother while she is holding the child or
pregnant).
65.

18.

66.

67.

BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 45, at 50; Dalton et al., supra note 51, at
BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 45, at 50.

Id.
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power between men and women that invite children to adopt the view that
the father's violence toward mother can be rationalized and accepted. 68
Not surprisingly, there is tremendous agreement among commentators
that joint custody, legal or physical, is not desirable in families in which
there is a history of domestic violence. 69 Even commentators like Meyer
Elkin and Sanford Braver, who are strong advocates of joint custody because of the message and opportunities that it provides for fathers, recognize that it is a bad option in situations in which there is domestic violence. 7 0 Most joint custody statutes also recognize this and make exceptions for settings in which there has been violence. Thus, for example, the
proposed Massachusetts statute that would establish a presumption that
shared legal and shared physical custody are in the child's best interests
also recognizes that a court that finds evidence of domestic violence may
not grant shared custody. 7 1 Enacted state statutes tend to have similar exceptions.72 The problem with this approach is that it puts the burden of
proving domestic violence on the victim of that violence.
Proof of domestic violence is extremely difficult because of the nature
and effects of the violence itself. Because of the effects of the violence on
its victims, they have a tendency to react in ways that make the violence
invisible. It is rarely reported to officials who might keep records.7 3 Edna
Erez has chronicled some of the reasons for this:
Oftentimes in the beginning of the relationship, victims feel
shame, guilt or inadequacy about their presumed contribution to the conflict. Other reasons [for not reporting the
abuse] include fear of losing the financial or economic
support the abuser provides, desire to keep the family unit
intact, concern for their children's emotional attachment to
the abuser, and perceived or real lack of options to leave
the abuser and become self sustaining. Fear of the abuser
68.

Id. (quoting D.J. Hurley & P. Jaffe, Children's Observations of Violence, 35

CAN. J. PSYCH. 471, 472 (1990)).
69.
MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 7, at 285; FOLBERG, supra note 20, at 9.
70.
ELKIN, supra note 14, at 14; BRAVER, supra note 22.

71.
S. 940 (Mass. 2003).
72.
E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-914(a) (2) (2003) (the presumption is rebuttable if
there is evidence of an intrafamily offense); FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13(2)(b) (2003) (a presumption against mandated shared custody if there has been a felony in the third degree or higher
of domestic violence); IDAHO CODE § 32-717(B)(5) (a presumption against joint custody if
one of the parents is a habitual perpetrator of domestic violence).
73.
Most statistical summaries of domestic violence recognize this underreporting.
E.g., Intimate Partner Violence Prevention Fact Sheet, National Center of Injury Control

and Prevention, at http://www.athealth.com/Consumer/issues/domviol.html (last visited Feb.
12, 2005).
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becomes a major reason for non-reporting of the violence
as the violence increases or intensifies. Abusers often
threaten to kill their partners if they leave, and research has
shown that such threats need to be taken seriously ....
In addition, victims of sexual violence are likely to be particularly reluctant to report the abuse for fear of having to describe the coercive sex. 75
Since sexual violence is very common, this probably contributes significantly to women's reluctance to come forward.76 There are also significant
reporting issues for women in various minority communities. Some women
of color may be reluctant to report abuse by men of their community because they believe that the police and society in general are already frequently abusive toward the men. Reporting domestic violence may simply
be seen as a way of "piling on" when the men are already devalued and
belittled.7 7
Other women from minority communities may be unwilling to report
the abuse because they believe it will make the entire family, or even the
entire community, look bad.78 Similarly, victims of gay or lesbian domestic
violence may be unwilling to report it for all of the above reasons and also
because of a fear of being "outed. ' 79 For all of these reasons, victims of
domestic violence are often reluctant to report the violence, resulting in
severe underreporting.
It is also often difficult for society to recognize abuse because it does
not look like what one expects to see. Domestic violence need not involve
constant, regular, or even frequent serious physical violence. Domestic
violence is often as debilitating and disabling as it is because of the abuser's
control over all aspects of the victim's life. The abuser obtains this control
through the creation of a private set of rules often known only to him and
74.

Edna Erez, Domestic Violence and the Criminal Justice System: An Overview, 7

ONLINE J. OF ISSUES IN NURSING (Jan. 31, 2002), at

http://www.nursingworld.org/ojin/topicl7/tpcl7_3.htm (last visited Feb. 12,2005).
75.
Jaffe, supra note 43, at 59 (reluctance to disclose spousal rape).
76.
Sarah M. Harless, From the Bedroom to the Courtroom, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 305,
306 (2003) (one in seven married or formerly married women have been raped by their husbands).
77.
Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics
and Violence Against Women of Color,43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1257 (1991).
78.
Karin Wang, Battered Asian American Women: Community Responses from the
Battered Women's Movement and the Asian American Community, 3 ASIAN L. REV. 151,
161, 167-71 (1996), quoted in BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW 160 (Clare Dalton and
Elizabeth M. Schneider, eds., 2001); Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by
Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 231, 241(1994) (Latinas are expected to give priority to family needs).
79.
Nancy E. Murphy, Queer Justice: Equal Protectionfor Victims of Same-Sex
Domestic Violence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 335,341-342 (1995).
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his victim. This system is thoroughly described by Karla Fischer, Neil
Vidmar and Rene Ellis, who recount the story of a victim of abuse who said
of herself:
I can't talk to adults. I don't know how to talk to people because my opinion doesn't ever count. I feel like I never had
an opinion on politics or on life. I don't know how to interact because he would [always] be going like this to me
[mimicking abuser's gesture of drawing a line with his index finger] ... that was his big signal to make me shut up,
or he'd be kicking me under the table to shut my mouth.8 °
Similarly, Lundy Bancroft and Jay Silverman tell of a client who, before separating from his wife had told her, "I love you, and that's for life. If
I can't have you, no one else will, and we're going to die together." After
separation, he sent her the message that he would always love her. 8 1 In this
context, the message was much more frightening to her than the same message would have been to someone else. In both of these examples, the gestures and comments are signs, part of a "culture of battering" because they
stand for something bigger than the particular gesture or statement.8 2 They
remind the victim of the lurking possibility of violence. As a result, it is not
necessary for batterers to be physically abusive frequently. Indeed, much,
if not most, of the abuse is likely to be verbal.83 What is important (and
terrifying) to the victim is the understanding that she shares with the abuser
the meaning of the sign. As Fischer, Vidmar and Ellis show, the culture of
battering is important "as a way of emphasizing the subtlety of the dynamics of abusive relationships and the difficulty that outsiders, even those professionally trained and experienced in dealing with battering, may have in
,84
identifying what is taking place in a controlled setting.
has been dowhich
there
in
Finally, it is hard to recognize situations
deny or
frequently
mestic violence because both the victims and the abusers
80.

Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Do-

81.

BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 45, at 76.

mestic Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117, 2117 (1993) (alteration in original) (quoting
Karla Fischer, The Psychological Impact and Meaning of Court Orders of Protection for
Battered Women (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Illinois) (on file with author)).

82.
The evocative phrase "culture of battering" comes from Fischer et al., supra
note 81, at 2117.
83.
Jaffe et al., supra note 43, at 59 (showing sixty percent of the study's subjects
reported that abuse was primarily verbal).
84.
Fischer et al., supra note 81, at 2120; Dalton et al., supra note 52, at 15 (abusive
relationships involve a set of rules about coming home on time, answering the telephone,
keeping the children quiet, cleanliness, etc.).
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minimize the extent of the violence. Bancroft and Silverman describe how
their batterer clients deny being violent even if there is clear evidence to the
contrary. If they admit to being violent toward their partners, they will often admit to only some of the violence or to reduced levels of violence. At
other times they characterize the violence as self-defense or describe it in a
context that excuses it. For example, an abuser might admit to being violent by saying, inaccurately, "I did shove her a couple of times ... when
she called my mother a whore, and I really regret it. But now she's saying I
grabbed her.., and threatened to kill her, which I would never do and she
knows it."' 85 At still other times, batterers present themselves as the real
victims who have resorted to violence only because they were so provoked
they could no longer stand it. 86 They might also characterize the victim's
allegations as purely vindictive, perhaps to get back at the batterer for paying insufficient attention to her.87 As a result, it may look like the parties
are angry at each other for any of a variety of reasons, but not look like
there was really any effort to control the other through domestic violence.
This is exacerbated by many victims' tendencies to minimize the extent of
the violence. For many of the same reasons that victims are reluctant to
report the violence in the first place, they will minimize its seriousness
when discussing it. Martha Mahoney suggests that victims of violence do
this partly for reasons of self-esteem and partly as a coping mechanism. 88 If
batterers deny the violence totally or say, "Oh, it was really nothing," and if
victims agree that there really was nothing to worry about, then it is not
surprising that others also miss the significance of the violence.
Courts tend to miss the presence or importance of domestic violence
for reasons very similar to those that account for its general invisibility in
society.89 We can see this by looking at cases decided under state statutes
that create a presumption against awarding custody to a batterer. 90 These
cases are particularly interesting because they represent situations in which
the victim has had the strength to recognize the violence and to assert it as
part of her case for why she should be given custody of the children. Despite this, the courts often do not acknowledge its importance, or, if they do,
they find reasons to dismiss its significance. Just as victims and batterers
85.
BANCROFT& SILVERMAN, supra note 45, at 18-19.
86.
Dalton et al., supra note 51, at 16.
87.
BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 45, at 18-19.
88.
Mahoney, supra note 44, at 15-19.
89.
See generally Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child
Protection, II AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 657 (2003) (discussing why judges in civil
suits often place little import on claims of domestic violence).
90.
For a thorough look at the presumption statutes, see Nancy K.D. Lemon, Statutes Creating Rebuttable Presumptions Against Custody to Batterers: How Effective Are
They?, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 601 (2001).
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tend to deny and minimize the violence, so do courts. Furthermore, familial
cultures of violence are hard for courts to discern; victims often do not have
official records of the violence that they can use as proof, and statutory
definitions of abuse focus on serious physical harm instead of the mechanisms of control that underlie partner abuse. Our experience with these
statutes is particularly important because if instances of violence are often
discounted despite statutory recognition that it is undesirable to give a batterer custody, one can expect9 1similar results under joint custody statutes that
exclude battering situations.
A couple of examples may be useful in illustrating how easy it is for
courts to miss the significance of domestic violence. In In re Marriage of
Mulford, the Iowa Court of Appeals upheld a trial court award of joint legal
custody to the mother and father and physical custody to the father. 92 The
court believed that the statutory presumption against awarding custody to
the batterer did not apply because both parents had requested joint legal
custody. 93 In considering the child's best interests, the trial court downplayed two significant incidents of violence within months of the couple's
separating and allegations of earlier incidents. Both of the incidents that the
court described in detail involved the husband's pushing the wife down. In
one, he picked up a kitchen knife and threatened to kill himself. In the
other, she claimed he tried to choke her. The husband pled guilty to misdemeanor domestic abuse assault in the kitchen knife incident; the choking
incident resulted in the issuance of a civil protective order. In both incidents, the husband claimed that the wife had started the violence. The trial
court found these incidents to be "aberration[s]" due to the temporary stress
of the breakdown of the marriage.9 4
Here, a legislative directive against awarding custody to a batterer was
undermined by the court's failure to recognize the domestic violence. The
Iowa statute requires the trial court to take into consideration whether there
91.
I do not mean to argue that statutes creating a presumption against giving custody to a batterer are never effective; there are instances in which they have worked wonderfully. An example is In re Marriage of Nadasdy, in which the wife accused the husband of
attempting to murder her. No. G029624, 2003 WL 413595 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2003).
Although the charges were ultimately dismissed because of insufficient evidence, the wife
sought a protective order which the court granted, finding the husband to be the "primary

aggressor." Id. at *1. This was sufficient for the court hearing the custody matter to invoke
the statutory presumption, despite noting that the father was "not likely [to] harm" the child.
Id. at *2. It is clear that the statute worked in this case to protect the mother and child from

an abusive husband/father; the mother had to move away to protect herself and the child and
the father subsequently sued her for malicious prosecution of her charge of attempted murder. Id.
92.
No. 03-1259, 2004 WL 894566 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2004).
93.
Id. at *2.
94.

Id. at *3.
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is a history of domestic violence when it is deciding how to award custody.
Furthermore, if there is such a history it will outweigh all other factors in
the custody determination. 95 The court's failure to do this and its interpretation of the statute in a way that was not required of it are indications of the
difficulties in relying on courts to recognize domestic violence in contested
custody cases.
Similarly, in King v. King, the parents were awarded joint legal custody, with the father receiving physical custody of the child.96 The Idaho
Supreme Court found that the statutory presumption against giving joint
legal custody to a batterer did not apply because the father was not a "habitual perpetrator of domestic violence" as required to invoke the presumption. However, this was a father who was violent toward the mother approximately a dozen times during a five year marriage, beginning within
months of the parties' marriage and lasting up until its last year. The court
discounted this violence, noting that "[tihere was evidence that both parties
initiated violence against the other, with Justin initiating violence against
Melissa more often than she did against him., 97 It described the parties'
relationship as "dysfunctional. 98 The court also excused much of the early
violence as being due to the husband's mental illness.99 The husband's
attorney, like the court, portrayed fights as a form of dispute resolution, not
violence. °° The husband's trial testimony describes the violence as minor
and not his fault.' 0 Again, the result in this case, like the result in In re
Marriage of Mulford, shows that the statutory presumptions against awarding custody to a batterer are not very effective.10 2 In addition, the court
quoted testimony from trial indicating that "Melissa is not a good housekeeper. The house.., was filthy, dirty dishes, dirty laundry, unmade beds,3
etc." It noted that the house was kept cleaner without Melissa's presence.
95.

IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (2)(c) (West 2001).

96.
50 P.3d 453 (Idaho 2002).
97.
Id. at 458-59.
98.
Id. at 456.
Id. at 459.
99.
100.
Respondent's Brief at *16, King v. King, 50 P.3d 453 (Idaho 2002) (No. 27271)
available at 2001 WL 34643194 (Aug. 2, 2001). "It was a dysfunctional relationship and
the parties frequently resolved their differences by fighting." Id.
Id. at *15. "There was plenty of fighting, but I didn't cause all the fighting,
101.
there was [sic] reasons. There were a myriad of reasons why we fought .... [L]ike I said, it
was a stormy relationship." Id.
102.
This is not an argument for repealing these statutes. They are better than nothing. Without them, the arguments for not awarding custody to a batterer would be significantly weaker. While the statutes do not prevent the batterer from getting custody in all
cases, they do work in some cases. See In re Marriage of Nadasdy, No. G029624, 2003 WL
413595 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2003); Maalouf v. Saliba, 766 N.E.2d 552 (Mass. App. Ct.
2002).
103.

King, 50 P.3d at 458.
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In both of these cases, the courts minimized the extent and effects of
the violence. In In re Marriage of Mulford, the court characterized two
potentially serious incidents as "aberrational" despite the fact that there
were also allegations of other violence between the parties. °4 The appellate
court's failure even to describe this additional violence is an indication of
how little importance it was given. Other courts have also denied the significance of intimate violence by claiming that the incidents are simply
isolated occurrences with no connection to each other. The implication is
that they do not contribute to a dynamic of power and control. For example, in Ryan v. Flemming,t0 5 the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld a trial
court determination that knocking a flower pot across the room at one point
and pulling the phone from the wall at another time were merely isolated
incidents. 0 6 The court did not understand that these could be intimidating
to the woman at whom they were aimed, despite the fact that it quotes her
as having said that she feared for her own and her children's safety and left
the house the same day the child's father sent the flower pot sailing across
the room. In fact, courts often cite incidents as isolated, and therefore unimportant in terms of custody statutes, despite the fact that the opinions
often 0reflect
multiple incidents of violence during the course of the relation7
ship.
At other times, courts minimize the effects of the violence by focusing
on the absence of injuries as an indication that the violence is not significant and should not invoke the presumption. In In re Marriageof Mulford,
the court noted that none of the various incidents had been reported to the
police, implying that they could not have been very serious. 0 8 Similarly, in
King v. King, the husband's attorney had noted that neither of the parties
had ever sought protective orders or pursued criminal charges. He argued
that "[a]pparently, neither viewed the other's conduct as 'violence. ' " 0 9
Even a criminal conviction is sometimes not enough to make the court take
the violence seriously. In In re Marriageof Riedel, the father pled guilty to
104.
No. 03-1259, 2004 WL 894566, at *3 (referring to these incidents as "altercations.").
105.
533 N.W.2d 920, 924 (N.D. 1995).
106.
Id.
107.
McGee v. McGee, 745 So. 2d 708 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (several slaps and an
incident with a chair and a hammer as to which the trial court did not even comment);

Brown v. Brown, 867 P.2d 477 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that three incidents of vio-

lence in a one-year marriage were insufficient to show "ongoing" abuse within the meaning

of the statute).
108.
No. 03-1259, 2004 WL 894566, *3 n.l. See also McGee v. McGee, 745 So.2d
708 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (noting several slaps, none of which resulted in serious physical

injury).
109.

34643194.

Respondent's Brief at *16, King v. King, 50 P.3d 453 available at 2001 WL
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felony spousal abuse; nevertheless, the court diminishes its import by noting that the violence in the marriage consisted primarily of "pushing and
shoving, and one incident of hitting when Sophia suffered a minor cut on
her finger."" 0 Finally, in Ryan v. Flemming, the North Dakota case with
the hurtling flower pot, the court noted that there was never any claim of
physical violence toward the mother."' But, physical violence is only one
way that domestic violence is injurious to children. In Ryan, the children's
mother was sufficiently scared of the father's violent possibilities to leave
the home that very day. As we have seen, children are affected by threats
of violence as well as by the violence itself. Domestic violence should not
be downplayed just because it has not yet resulted in serious physical injury
to its target.
Courts also minimize the violence by saying that it occurred too long
ago to be meaningful in thinking about custody now. In C.B. v. M.R. -B.,
the father had been arrested for offensive touching and was subsequently
charged with violating a protective order.1 2 At the trial on these charges,
the father elected to participate in a first offender program, which he completed. Four years later, in trying the issue of custody, the family court
declared the earlier events to be too long ago to be relevant." 3 Similarly, in
In re Custody of Eliza, the court gave no weight to evidence of three episodes of violence that had happened five years earlier.' 1 4 Although the
statute included a presumption against giving custody to someone who had
engaged in a pattern of abuse, the court relied on the claim that there had
been no subsequent occurrence of the violence." 5 However, this does not
take into account that violence years earlier can still create an atmosphere
of fear in which the victim of the violence is subject to the abuser's control.
This atmosphere of tension affects children, making it inappropriate to
award custody to the abuser. In In re Custody of Eliza, the judge relied on
claims that the child did not fear the abuser to justify discounting the violence from five years earlier. The judge also noted that, despite clear evidence to the contrary, the mother had testified that the father had never been
violent toward her. There was also evidence that the father had been violent at work and with the child's maternal grandfather. All of this is consistent with the creation of a culture of fear based on earlier violence and not
No. C036947, 2002 WL 2013461, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2002).
533 N.W.2d 920, 924 (N.D. 1995).
No. CS97-03499, 2002 WL 31453495 (Del. Fam. Ct. Apr. 5, 2002).
113. Id. at *14.
755 N.E.2d 835 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001); see also Krank v. Krank, 529 N.W. 2d
114.
concurring) (noting that the mere passage of time might
844, 851 (N.D. 1995) (Neumann, J.,
be sufficient to avoid or rebut the statutory presumption).
115.
755 N.E.2d 835 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001); Schmid v. Schmid, No. C9-99-1080,
2000 WL 108785 (Minn. Ct. App.) (noting violence four years old and not repeated).
110.
111.
112.
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even admitted by the mother. The court did not recognize this culture of
fear.
In re Custody of Eliza is not the only case in which the court's failure
to recognize the dynamics and culture of battering may result in its misapplication of a statutory presumption against awarding custody to an abuser.
The court in In re Marriage of Mulford, described above, had discounted
two incidents of violence that occurred as the couple was separating. In
addition to labeling the husband's conduct "aberration[al]," the court attributed the violence to a temporary emotional breakdown caused by the stress
of the dissolution of the marriage and the potential loss of custody of the
children. 16 This is certainly one explanation for the events, but another
way of understanding it would be in terms of a hidden culture of violence
and control in which these two recent outbursts of violence are a response
to the separation. After all, one of the most dangerous periods for victims
of domestic violence is during the time when the relationship is coming
apart.' 17 A court that is not well versed in the cultures of intimate violence
is likely to miss this fact.
Courts also misunderstand the dynamics and cultures of violent relationships in other ways that may result in not recognizing domestic violence
despite its presence. Abusers frequently claim that their victims have provoked their violence. In this way, batterers present themselves as the true
victims of the violence. This both minimizes the wrongfulness of their own
violence and reinforces a culture in which victims feel responsible for
bringing the violence upon themselves. Courts often focus on the fact that
the violence has been provoked without focusing on the roles that claims of
provocation play within the culture of domestic violence." 8 For example,
in Simmons v. Simmons, the court found the presumption against giving
custody to a batterer to be inapplicable despite the wife's claim of several
incidents of violence.' 19 The court excused the violence on the grounds that
it had been provoked by the wife's adultery and that it had never occurred
in the children's presence; however, it is important to realize that the wife
claimed multiple incidents of violence. Was the court claiming that they
were all provoked? And, if it is, does the court think that the wife will experience the violence as not being controlling because it was provoked?
Finally, the children in this case, although perhaps never injured by the vio116.

No. 03-1259, 2004 WL 894 566, at *3 (Iowa App. Ct. Apr. 28, 2004).

117.
Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation,90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991).

118.
This is not to argue that women never instigate the violence. Rather, the point is
that claims of provocation are part and parcel of a culture of violence and courts should
recognize them as signs that there may be continuing, but masked, violence.
119.
649 So. 2d 799 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
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lence, were sufficiently aware of it to testify about it.' 20 Had the court understood the way violence functions within the culture of a family, it might
have ruled differently.
Some courts misunderstand the culture of violence and interpret violence as mutual.12' Claiming that the violence is mutual is another way in
which abusers minimize their own responsibility and make the victim of the
violence feel responsible for it. Sometimes what the abuser considers to be
mutual violence is really the victim's engaging in self-defense. An excellent example of this is in Krank v. Krank. 22 Neither parent in this case was
a saint, and both apparently were heavy users of drugs and alcohol. The
couple lived together for three years and then separately for three. It was
during this period of living apart that their child was born. After this, they
tried living together again for half a year and then separated. The mother
claimed that the father was repeatedly violent during the first three years
that they lived together, followed by emotional and mental abuse. 123 She
said he broke her fingers once, raped her more than once, threw things at
her, grabbed her by her hair, and pushed her, bruising her face. She obtained a protective order against him. She also claimed that she accidentally shot him while trying to ward off an attempted rape. The father told a
different story, denying most of the incidents, asserting that the shooting
was unprovoked, and claiming that she sometimes attacked and threw
things at him. 124 The trial court had applied the statutory presumption
against the father, but the North Dakota Supreme Court remanded for consideration of whether there was mutual violence. It instructed the trial court
to consider the "amount and extent" of violence inflicted by each party. If
these are roughly the same for both parents, then the presumption does not
apply. 25 What is missing from this analysis is an understanding of the dynamics and cultures of domestic violence. A victim of violence might appear to be the instigator of an incident if considerations like self-defense
and diminishing tension are not taken into account. 126 Simply counting the

Id. at 802.
120.
Again, I do not deny that in some relationships the parties may be equally re121.
sponsible for the violence and the courts may appropriately identify it as mutual. However,
courts should recognize that these assertions of mutual violence may also be a sign of an
abusive intimate relationship.
529 N.W. 2d 844.
122.
Id. at 846.
123.
124.
Id.
Id.at 850.
125.
Lenore Walker, TERRIFYING LOVE 43 (1989) (some victims of violence provoke
126.
the violence to end the escalating tension that they know will end sometime in a violent
incident); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularityand Generality: Challenges of Feminist
Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 520, 557 (1992) (fact-
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number of incidents involving each party and the amount of violence
caused in each does not take into account the effects of living within the
culture of violence.
Finally, courts frequently claim that the effects of the statutory presumptions have been rebutted by evidence that the victim of violence would
not make a good parent for the child.127 Indeed, it would be more honest to
say that the court's concerns were that the victimized parent would not
make a good mother. In most of these cases, the victim is a woman, and in
most of these cases her perceived deficiencies cause her to lack some quality associated with ideal mothers. Furthermore, courts rarely consider
whether these apparent defects in the victim are due to the violence. One
criticism of victims that is commonly used is, as we have seen, that they
provoke the violence. Not only does this minimize the moral wrongfulness
of the abuser's conduct, it also makes the woman look equally (or sometimes more) morally unattractive. Certainly this is the case in the Simmons
case, discussed above. Referring to the wife's provocative conduct gives
the court an opportunity to note her possible adultery. 28 Similarly, in King
v. King, the court found the mother to be a bad housekeeper. 29 The mother
insisted that there was no reason to attribute the poor housekeeping to her
instead of to her former husband, but the court rejected that argument on the
grounds that the house was cleaner with the mother out of it. What this
means is that the ex-husband is able to keep house when she is not there.130
It does not say anything about whether both he and the court are expecting
her to keep the house clean if both are living in it.
Courts may also find against victimized mothers, despite statutory presumptions to the contrary, if the mothers evince suspicion about their expartners' conduct or capacity as fathers. This is a normal, protective role
for mothers who have been the subjects of domestic violence.' 31 Courts
finders are likely to misunderstand women victim's self-defense as an aggressive act of
violence).

127.
Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding JudicialResistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y

& L., 657 (2003) (describing the effects of gender bias in deciding family law domestic
violence cases).
128.
Simmons v. Simmons, 649 So.2d 799, 802 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
129.
50 P.3d 453, 458 (Idaho 2002).
130.
It is interesting that the court does not say anything about the wife's housekeeping abilities when the husband is not around. This omission leads to the assumption that the
wife is correct in claiming that the court's assumption was that she was the one responsible
for housekeeping when the parties lived together. Without her, things suddenly became
clean. If the court had been thinking that the disorder during the marriage was perhaps due
to the strain between the parties, it should have looked at both of their residences after they
separated.
131.
BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 45, at 96.
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often do not see it this way and may instead find the mother to be vindictive
or hysterical, characteristics which are unattractive in a mother who is
thought to be responsible for facilitating familial relationships. In In re
Marriage of Riedel, a case in which the ex-husband had pled guilty to felony spousal abuse, the court nonetheless found two years later that the presumption had been rebutted, and awarded him custody of the parties' four
and a half year old child. Up until this time the child had always been cared
for by the mother. For a while after the felony conviction, the father had
only had supervised visitation with the child. Once the father received unsupervised visitation, the mother began to worry that he was abusing the
child. The court discounted the fact that eight reports of abuse were made
because it said that the mother made five of them and mandated reporters
32 Of course, that leaves one
made two more based on evidence from her.
report unaccounted for. Apparently someone other than the mother was
also suspicious of the father's conduct with the child. The mother's concerns are further supported by the trial court's finding that "although [the
father's] touching of [the child's] scrotum evidences a 'certain undersotypes of
cialization [sic] or lack of knowledge or caring about' 1permissible
3 Perhaps the court
abuse."
sexual
of
level
the
touching,' it did not rise to
is correct. Perhaps touching the child's scrotum only indicates a certain
naivetd, but it is not hard to imagine the mother who would worry when her
child told her that and other, similar touchings had occurred. Regardless of
whether most mothers would worry in such a situation, to call this mother
"histrionic" and to accuse her of "hypervigilance" for having reported the
child's remarks and the finding of marks on his bottom is to play into
134
The court, however, went even further
stereotypes of hysterical women.
than that. It found that she was a bad mother because she did not engage in
the traditional role of holding the family together: she was unable or unwilling to cooperate in providing opportunities for visitation with her exhusband. 135 Thus, our experience with statutory presumptions against
awarding custody to batterers does not encourage us to think that presumptions in favor of joint custody that exclude situations in which there is domestic violence will be any more effective. Our experience with the presumptions against awarding custody to abusers demonstrates that the courts,
like society in general, have trouble recognizing domestic violence. PreIn re Marriage of Riedel, No. C036947, 2002 WL 2013461, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App.
132.
Sept. 4, 2002).
Id. at *13 n.12.
133.
Id. at *10.
134.
Id. at *13; see also In re Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P.3d 81 (Cal. 2004) (show135.
ing that the mother's continued custody of the children was in jeopardy because she did not
sufficiently encourage their relationship with their father despite evidence of earlier violence
between the parties).
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sumably the same factors---denial, minimization, failure to recognize the
social and cultural context, and gender-based preconceptions of how mothers should act-will cause courts to ignore, discount, or misunderstand domestic violence when considering statutes that create presumptions in favor
of joint custody even if the statutes include exclusions for situations involving domestic violence. The courts' failure to recognize domestic violence
is particularly important because the presumptions will have the most effect
in contested custody cases and, as we have already seen, an overwhelming
percentage of these involve domestic violence. It is in situations where a
court, not the parties, makes the custody decision that the presumption has
its most powerful effect. Yet these are also the cases most likely to involve
domestic violence. The result is that, unless we can trust the domestic violence exception to work so as to protect victims from being forced to share
custody with their batterers, we have to expect that many children will end
up in the shared custody of their abusive fathers and their victimized mothers. If we are serious about not applying a presumption in favor of joint
custody to families in which there has been domestic violence, we should
not create such a presumption. Given our experience with existing presumptions against giving custody to batterers, it seems unlikely that we can
trust a joint custody presumption with an exclusion for domestic violence to
be effective.
A quick look at how some of the existing statutory presumptions in favor of domestic violence are working will show that our concerns are justified. Many jurisdictions have a strong preference for allowing both parents
to be as involved as possible in raising their children after a divorce. 136
This is often implemented by an almost automatic recourse to joint legal
custody, regardless of how the court awards physical custody. In one particularly outrageous case from Iowa, the trial court awarded the mother
physical custody of the children and limited the father's visitation with
them. The trial court found that during the course of the marriage the father
had been physically violent toward the mother on numerous occasions, often in the children's presence. He had smashed a computer and knocked a
hole in the wall. In addition, the father had held the children's grandmother
against her will for five hours and then tried to convince one of the children
to tell the police that the grandmother had been the aggressor. Upon review, the appellate court found that the trial court should not have allowed
the father any visitation at all with the children until he had proven he
136.
Sometimes this is implemented through a broad statement of policy. E.g., P.A.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301 (West 2001) (stating policy of the Commonwealth is to ensure
continuing contact of the child with both parents); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 110.1 (West
1998) (stating that the policy of the state is to ensure "frequent and continuing" contact of
the child with both parents). Sometimes it is effectuated through a rebuttable presumption in
favor of joint custody. E.g., D.C. CODE § 16-914(a)(2) (Supp. 2004).
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would not pose a risk to them or the mother. Despite all of this, the court of
the trial court's original award of joint legal custody to
appeals left intact
1 37
parents.
the two
Clearly, both the trial court and the appellate court recognized the
danger that the father posed, yet neither gave the mother sole legal custody
of the children. The fact that Iowa's law establishing a preference for joint
custody includes a rebuttable presumption against awarding it if there is a
"history of domestic violence" did not change the award of joint legal custody.' 3 8 In fact, it is not even discussed in the case. The award of joint
legal custody means that the mother and the father will have to be able to
cooperate over the children's education, health care, religious training, and
so on. This is hardly conducive to her being able to withdraw from relations with her abusive former partner. This requirement for continuing contact also continues the danger for her. It is not unusual that courts that give
of the father's39
the mother physical custody of the children in part because
to both parents.'
custody
legal
joint
award
nevertheless
40
domestic violence
In re Marriageof LaMusga1
The recent California Supreme Court case of
also demonstrates quite dramatically the default position of courts: adopting
joint custody when they are unsure of what to do in a custody battle. It also
of a joint cusillustrates courts' failure to consider seriously the interplay
4' In LaMusga, the
relationships.'
violent
of
tody award with the dynamics
custody evaluator wrote that "'[t]here has been a great deal of verbal hostility between Mr. and Mrs. LaMusga for years, at times escalating to some
pushing and shoving ....,,,42 Neither the evaluator nor the courts made
any further findings of whether this was a case involving domestic violence
despite the fact that California has a presumption against giving custody to
an abuser. 143 Although the evaluator's statement is a classic minimization
of the violence, none of the courts-trial, appeals, or supreme-apparently
recognized it. Instead, the trial court simply awarded the parties joint legal
In re Marriage of Coulter, No. 02-0473, 2002 WL 31528589, at *3 (Iowa Ct.
137.
App. Nov. 15, 2002).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(l)(a), (l)(b), & (5) (2001). Iowa has recently
138.
amended its statute to make it more difficult to award joint legal custody without joint
physical custody. 2004 Iowa Legis. Serv. 1169 (West) (H.F. 22) (requiring specific findings
of fact if the court awards joint legal, but not joint physical, custody).
E.g., In re Marriage of Jaks, No. F038843, 2003 WL 257918 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb.
139.
violence case in which court awarded physical custody to mother, but
(domestic
2003)
6,
joint legal custody); Kuhn v. Danes, 821 A.2d 335 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2001) (mother received
sole physical custody with ex-husband's violence being considered as a best interest factor,
but the parents were awarded joint legal custody).
88 P.3d 81 (Cal. 2004).
140.
Id.
141.
142. Id.at 85.
143. CAL. FAM. CODE §3044 (West 2004).
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custody of the children with the mother having primary physical custody.44
The mother then petitioned for permission to move with the children half
way across the country to where her family lived. The custody evaluator
recommended against allowing the move. He blamed her for the children's
bad relationship with their father and he stated that "if the situation did not
improve, he might recommend either 'a truly joint custody arrangement' or
giving 'primary custody' to the father.' 45 This is a case in which the courts
have missed possible important evidence of domestic violence. Although
the mother may recognize that life for her and the children would be better
if she could move, the court's award of joint legal custody and the evaluator's threat of joint physical custody show very little consideration of the
possible negative effects of joint custody in a situation in which there may
have been a long history of domestic violence. 146
Some joint custody preferences are problematic for a second reason: a
.number of states create a presumption in favor of joint custody only if the
147
parties have agreed to it.
Agreements to joint custody among partners
where one has abused the other should be treated with great skepticism. I
am not concerned about joint custody agreements in situations in which
there has not been any violence, but I am concerned about them where there
has been violence. In this context, we need to worry that the abusive partner's violence, threats, and generally controlling behavior may cause the
victimized partner to agree to joint custody even in situations in which she
does not really want to do so. This is particularly a problem with agreements made on the eve of trial because, as indicated above, the vast majority of these cases are likely to involve domestic violence. In these cases,
the courts should be suspicious that the agreement may not have been freely
given.
Although the evidence is far from conclusive, mothers may trade away
other rights such as child support in order to maintain custody. 48 This is
particularly true in situations involving domestic violence where the abuser
may be litigating custody as a means of scaring his ex-partner and showing
her that he can still retain control over her life. 149 It makes sense in this
144.
145.

In re Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P.3d at 86.
Id. at 87.

146.
See Janet M. Bowermaster, Relocation Custody Disputes Involving Domestic
Violence, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 433, 437 (1998) (describing abusive fathers' opposition to

relocation as a means of maintaining control over the family).
147.

See CAL. FAM. CODE §3080 (West 2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-

101(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 666(a) (2002).

148.
Jeremy A. Matz, We're All Winners: Game Theory, the Adjusted Winner Procedure and Property Division of Divorce, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1339, 1363 (2001) (discussing

studies of trading custody for support).
149.
BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 45, at 114-15 (explaining how batterers
use custody litigation as a weapon); Tonia Ettinger, Domestic Violence and Joint Custody,

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

setting to imagine that a mother who has been subjected to intimate violence by her children's father might agree to joint custody with him so as
not to risk losing custody entirely. We can see this in case after case. In
Raney v. Wren, the divorce action was originally settled by consent of the
parties with the parties having joint legal custody and the husband receiving
domiciliary status.150 The mother remarried a few months after the divorce
after
15
and subsequently moved out of state with her new husband.of Atheyear
child.
custody
for
asking
petition
a
filed
she
divorce,
original
the
She claimed that her ex-husband had a history of being violent toward her
and that she had signed the original consent judgment only because of his
1 52
Similarly, in In re Marriage of Schropp, a
threats and abusive conduct.
mother who wanted sole legal and physical custody of the child, agreed to
joint legal custody in exchange for being able to move out-of-state with the
child.' 53 The mother was anxious to move because her husband had been
violent all through the marriage and the abuse was escalating now that they
were separated. "She wished to place distance between herself5 4and [her]
Like so
husband to avoid being victimized in an abusive relationship."'
violence
the
escape
to
desire
her
many other victims of intimate violence,
while retaining55custody of her child forced her to compromise her claims to
sole custody. 1
The risks entailed in creating a presumption in favor of joint custody
are great. Since the presumption has its most powerful effect when the parties cannot reach an agreement and must litigate, and since the class of people who litigate custody is disproportionately likely to include intimate
abusers, a presumption in favor of joint custody is particularly likely to be
dangerous. Unfortunately, the two devices that are often intended to be
protective of victims of violence--exceptions for domestic violence cases
and requirements for agreement-often turn out to be inadequate to protect
11 BuFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 90 (2002-2003) (recounting statements from victimized clients
that "the abuser was threatening to take the children away and that she would never be
granted custody.").
722 So.2d 54 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
150.
Id.at 55.
151.
court did not believe the mother's testimony as to the ex152. Id. at 58. The trial
husband's violence. Id.
No. H025384, 2004 WL 831259, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App.Apr. 19, 2004).
153.
Id. at *2.
154.
155. There are multiple examples of victims of violence who compromise on joint
custody apparently because of the violence and then regret having done so. See In re Marriage of Buric, No.C5-00-1973, 2001 WL 682871 (Minn.Ct. App. June 19, 2001) (amother
the state,
with post traumatic stress disorder due to abuse stipulated to joint custody and left
best
children's
the
in
not
was
custody
joint
that
stating
appeal,
her
refused
court
the
but
prodecree
consent
a
(upholding
interests); M.R. -B, No.CS97-03499, 2002 WL 31453495
had
father
the
because
mother
the
to
custody
physical
with
custody
viding for joint legal
allegedly been abusive toward the mother during the marriage).
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them. As we have seen, domestic violence exceptions from the presumption can only be effective if the court is informed of the violence and is able
to recognize it and its importance. For a variety of reasons, victims of intimate violence may not alert the court to the abuse. Additionally, for many
similar reasons, even if the litigant has tried to inform the court of the presence of violence in the relationship, the court may not recognize it or may
downplay its significance. As a result, courts may unwittingly order joint
custody in situations in which it may endanger both the victims of the violence and their children.
Similarly, courts cannot rely on the fact that the litigants have agreed
to joint custody as a means of ensuring that it will not endanger the parties
or their children. If the case has proceeded to the litigation stage-or even
to the stage of judicial intervention with an evaluator or court-ordered mediator-there is a heightened chance that domestic violence is involved.
Where there has been violence, the consent to joint custody may not be
freely given. The court should not simply accept it on the assumption that
it is voluntary.
I make two recommendations for statutes relating to joint custody.
First, they should never contain a presumption in favor of joint custody.
The same is true of prefatory statements of policy in favor of both parents
sharing time with the children equally. Although joint custody may work
very well for children whose parents continue to be able to interact well,
who have never suffered violence (physical, threatened, or psychological)
at the hands of the other parent, and who make these decisions on their own
without litigation, there is every reason to think that court-imposed joint
custody between parents who cannot resolve their problems without litigation will not work and may prove dangerous for the children and the victimized parent. Second, courts should not accept agreements to joint custody
on the eve of litigation. This is not to say these agreements should never be
accepted. There is no reason to be suspicious of them when they are made
by parents long before the case would be litigated. But, joint custody
agreements once the court has had to intervene to resolve custody should be
rejected by the court in favor of continuing to trial. Such a change in joint
custody statutes would be extremely protective of the children and the victimized spouse-the weaker parties in a marriage.

